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ABSTRACT 
Australian governments face the twin challenges of dealing with extreme weather-related 
disasters (such as floods and bushfires) and adapting to the impacts of climate change. 
These challenges are connected, so any response would benefit from a more integrated 
approach across and between the different levels of government. This report summarises the 
findings of an NCCARF-funded project that addresses this problem. The project undertook a 
three-way comparative case study of the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the 2011 Perth Hills 
bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. It collected data from the official inquiry reports into 
each of these events, and conducted new interviews and workshops with key stakeholders. 
The findings of this project included recommendations that range from the conceptual to the 
practical. First, it was argued that a reconceptualization of terms such as ‘community’ and 
‘resilience’ was necessary to allow for more tailored responses to varying circumstances. 
Second, it was suggested that the high level of uncertainty inherent in disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation requires a more iterative approach to 
policymaking and planning. Third, some specific institutional reforms were proposed that 
included: 1) a new funding mechanism that would encourage collaboration between and 
across different levels of government, as well as promoting partnerships with business and 
the community; 2) improving community engagement through new resilience grants run by 
local councils; 3) embedding climate change researchers within disaster risk management 
agencies to promote institutional learning; and, 4) creating an inter-agency network that 
encourages collaboration between organisations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As the climate changes, the population grows, and urban coastal development continues 
there is likely to be an increase in the exposure of people to extreme weather-related events 
such as bushfires and floods. This will entail significant environmental, economic and social 
impacts for Australia. An appropriate, effective and efficient response will therefore require 
the integration of both disaster risk management and climate change adaptation but there 
are three main barriers to achieving this integration. First, the impacts of both disasters and 
climate change are difficult to predict at the local level and require well-coordinated whole-of-
government responses, as well as the support of the private sector and the community. 
Second, the structure of the Australian federal system of government discourages 
cooperation between and within the different levels of government. Third, while a 
comprehensive response is urgently needed, policymaking processes tend to favour 
piecemeal change. 
This report summarises the findings of a research project that addresses this problem. The 
project aimed to develop the foundations for a nationally consistent approach to disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation that would be supported by a set of appropriate 
reforms to governing institutions and tools. The work was undertaken by a team of 
researchers from Griffith University and RMIT University over one year (2012) and was 
funded by the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF). The 
research centred on a three-way comparative case study of the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the 
2011 Perth Hills bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. It involved an analysis of the 
reports generated by the official inquiries into these disasters, interviews with key 
stakeholders, and stakeholder workshops in Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane. The first half of 
the project identified four common themes that emerged from both the academic literature 
and the inquiry reports on each of the case studies: 
• Improve interagency communication and collaboration; 
• Develop institutional arrangements that support continual improvement and policy 
learning; 
• Improve community engagement and communication; and, 
• Refocus attention on building resilience. 
These four themes provide points for the integration of disaster risk management and climate 
change adaptation. 
A reconceptualization of the problem indicated that concepts such as ‘community’ and 
‘resilience’ tend to be oversimplified by policymaking and planning processes. These 
concepts need to be recast to take account of socio-economic diversity and allow for more 
tailored, context-specific risk analyses and responses. This is particularly important with 
regards to community engagement. Further, the uncertainty inherent in both climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk management, along with the highly contested political context, 
suggests that an iterative approach to policymaking could be a more fruitful strategy than the 
rational comprehensive ideal. Some specific proposals for reforms/tools emerged from the 
stakeholder interviews and workshops during the second half of the project. First, was the 
idea to create a funding system that would encourage collaboration between agencies, 
businesses and communities. Second, was the proposal that local governments adjust their 
grant schemes to encourage the community to propose and vote on small-scale adaptation 
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projects that increase their resilience. Third was the idea of embedding climate change 
researchers within larger agencies, or getting them to form partnerships with smaller 
agencies, in order to encourage institutional learning and more integrated risk-context 
analyses. Finally, a number of organisational changes were proposed to increase inter-
organisational networking and support these reforms. These findings offer an opportunity for 
improving responses as well as a starting point for better integration of disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation.
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Climate change adaptation and disaster risk management have both been prominent on the 
public policy agenda over the last few years. It is predicted that as the climate changes 
further, as population grows, and as urban coastal development increases, the exposure of 
people to the impacts of weather-related disasters (such as floods and bushfires) will 
increase (IPCC 2012). While the policy responses to both issues have developed largely in 
isolation to date, they share the common goal of increasing community resilience. What is 
therefore needed is an integrated national response across all levels of government that 
makes the best use of scarce public resources and existing approaches (AFAC 2012).  
This is the final report of a research project entitled: The Right Tool for the Job: Achieving 
climate change adaptation outcomes through improved disaster management policies, 
planning and risk management strategies. This project aimed to develop the foundations for 
a nationally consistent approach to disaster risk management and climate change adaptation 
that would be supported by a set of appropriate reforms to governing institutions and tools. 
The project was undertaken by a team of researchers from Griffith University and RMIT 
University over one year (2012) and was funded by the National Climate Change Adaptation 
Research Facility (NCCARF). The research centred on comparative case studies of the 2009 
Victorian bushfires, the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. The first 
stage of the project involved a literature review that provided an overview of current disaster 
risk management arrangements and climate change adaptation policies in Australia. Stage 
two centred on an analysis of official inquiry reports into each of the three case studies to 
identify common themes. A series of semi-structured interviews were then conducted with 
key stakeholders in Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane, to examine these themes in more detail 
and to develop proposals for change. Finally, three workshops were held (one in each city) 
with a broader range of practitioners and stakeholders to review the proposed changes and 
identify any gaps in the research. 
This report is divided into twelve sections. Following this introduction, the second section 
outlines the nature of the research problem and the objectives of this project. Section three 
then gives a brief outline of the research activities undertaken and the methods used for data 
collection and analysis. The institutional and policy context is provided in section four with an 
overview of: the Australian system of government; the policymaking process; key climate 
adaptation policies; and, disaster risk management arrangements. Section five offers a 
background to the three cases studies. Sections six to ten cover the project’s key findings on: 
interagency communication and collaboration; institutional improvement and learning; 
community engagement and communication; a renewed focus on resilience; and the 
integration of disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Section eleven 
offers a reconceptualization of the problem and four proposals for change as the foundations 
of a new approach. This is followed by some concluding remarks in section twelve. 
It should be noted that the purpose of this research project is not to criticise the actions of 
emergency service workers and volunteers who do an excellent job under extreme 
circumstances. It should also be noted that the emergency services were not originally set up 
to deal with the kind of extreme large-scale events that this project has used as case studies. 
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2. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
The best available scientific risk analyses indicate that the climate is changing and there will 
be significant environmental, economic and social impacts as a consequence. The 
environmental impacts include rising temperatures, increases in sea levels, coastal erosion, 
changing precipitation patterns, reductions in ice and snow cover, loss of habitat, accelerated 
species extinction, and an increase in the frequency, duration and/or intensity of weather-
related events such as cyclones, storms, floods, heatwaves, droughts and bushfires. The 
projected economic impacts include the loss of agricultural production, increased damage to 
built assets, higher insurance costs, greater defensive infrastructure costs, and more 
resources spent on emergency responses. The forecast social impacts include higher 
mortality and injury rates, damage to homes, the loss of livelihoods, an decrease in fresh 
water availability, an increase in food scarcity, a rise in the number of displaced people, and 
an increased risk of conflict (IPCC 2007, 2012; Royal Society 2010; AAS 2010; NOAA 2010; 
Stern 2005). The risk-context of each community will therefore vary according to its climate, 
geography, and socio-economic status. 
Australia is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to its geography, 
economy and settlement patterns. Although it is difficult to accurately predict local impacts, 
the long-term trend is for the majority of the temperate south to become drier and the tropical 
north to become wetter. For the southern areas this is likely to translate into a significant 
reduction in crop production, increased pressure on water supplies, and an increased risk of 
bushfires. For the tropics, it is likely to result in increased risks from storms and cyclones. 
Because most of the major Australian population centres are located on the coast they face a 
higher risk of inundation and coastal erosion. Further, the likelihood of more frequent, 
extreme and prolonged heatwaves will likely increase the rate of mortality, particularly 
amongst the elderly and the ill (IPCC 2007, 2012; CSIRO 2010; Garnaut 2011). 
Some examples of what is to come might be drawn from recent history. The 2011 
Queensland floods demonstrated what happens when there is a deluge in catchment areas 
that feed into major cities and towns, while the 2009 Victorian bushfires and 2011 Perth Hills 
bushfires revealed the increased fire risk from prolonged dry periods. It should be noted, 
however, that climate scientists are reluctant to attribute specific events such as these to 
climate change. Floods, droughts and bushfires have always been a part of the Australian 
environment, but these kinds of events are likely to increase because of climate change 
(IPCC 2012; QFCI 2011, 2012; GWA 2011; VBRC 2010c). The argument put forward here is 
simply that climate change is linked to disaster risk management through these weather-
related events so an integrated and improved response to both is needed. 
The complex and far reaching nature of climate change has led many to label it a ‘wicked’ 
policy problem (APSC 2007; Head 2008; Rittel & Webber 1973) and some have even gone 
so far as to call it ‘diabolical’ (Garnaut 2008). The concept of wicked problems was 
developed by Rittel and Webber (1973) who gave them ten defining attributes: 
1. They are difficult to define;  
2. There is no end or boundary to the problem;  
3. There is no agreed criteria to judge the correctness of a response;  
4. Responses have unforeseen consequences; 
5. Responses that go wrong cannot be easily undone; 
4 Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation  
 
6. It is not possible to identify all options; 
7. There is no suitable precedent to guide decision makers; 
8. They are interconnected with other problems; 
9. There is no agreed explanation of the problem; and, 
10. Mistakes in either action or inaction are very costly. 
While climate change clearly exhibits these attributes, it is interesting to ask whether the 
move to classify them as ‘wicked’ might also be an indictment of the limitations of existing 
systems of government.  
Because climate change has significant implications for politics and public policy from the 
international through to the national, state and local levels of government it cannot be 
handled by a single agency or portfolio and need a nationally consistent approach (Howes & 
Dedekorkut-Howes 2012). In addition, the link between climate change and extreme 
weather-related events requires context specific risk analyses for communities as well as an 
integrated response in both adaptation policy/planning and disaster risk management. The 
prevailing institutional structures and policymaking processes, however, may create 
significant barriers in developing an effective, efficient and appropriate response. 
The objective of this project was to address this research problem by:  
1. reconceptualising the twin problems of disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation;  
2. developing the foundation for a new integrated approach; and,  
3. proposing practical changes to existing policy/planning responses.  
Specifically, this project addressed the National Adaptation Research Plan for Emergency 
Management across-theme priority 4.1, project 1, research question 1.2: What tools are 
needed to enable decision-making under future climate uncertainty? 
 
Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation 5 
 
3. RESEARCH ACTIVITIES AND METHODS 
This research project ran from January to December 2012 and was funded by a grant from 
the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF). Due to the short 
timeframe, the broad scope of the research question, and the objective of producing practical 
outcomes, a tightly focussed comparative case study approach was adopted as the overall 
research strategy. Three case studies were chosen: the 2009 Victorian bushfires; the 2011 
Perth Hills bushfires; and, the 2011 Brisbane floods. These cases were selected for several 
reasons. First, they offer examples of the kinds of disasters that are likely to become more 
frequent, intense and/or prolonged under the impacts of climate change on Australia. 
Second, they are examples of events that put extreme pressure on existing government 
institutions, policies and plans, hence offering the opportunity to identify what works well and 
what needs to change. Third, they are geographically dispersed across the continent (from 
north to south and east to west) and involved three different state governments, which makes 
the research findings more generalisable and gives them national implications.  
The project proceeded in several stages. Stage one consisted of a literature review and 
document analysis conducted in the first few months of the project. The purpose of this stage 
was threefold. First, it elaborated the institutional structure of the Australian system of 
government in order to identify any features that would be pertinent to this project. Second, it 
reviewed the significance of long-running debates regarding policymaking processes. Third, 
it assembled a composite picture of the relevant disaster risk management and climate 
change adaptation risk analyses and responses. This review then provided the foundation for 
the rest of the research. 
Stage two consisted of a comparative analysis of the reports generated by the Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC 2010 a, b, c), the Perth Hills Bushfire Review (GWA 
2011), and the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI 2011, 2012). Each inquiry 
report was analysed to identify what was covered and what was not covered with regards to: 
how the emergency response was done well; what could be improved; the barriers to 
change; and, any links to climate change. These findings were then grouped into major 
themes and compared to the literature on disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation. Four common themes for changes to in that spanned all three reports and the 
literature were then identified. First, there was a need to improve interagency communication 
and collaboration. Second, there was a need to develop institutional arrangements that 
support continual improvement and policy learning. Third, there was a need to improve 
community engagement and communication. Finally, there was a need to refocus attention 
on resilience. These four themes provided both opportunities to improve existing responses 
and points for integration between disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. 
Stage three took the four themes identified and used them to create a set of semi-structured 
interview questions for key stakeholders. These stakeholders were drawn from a range of 
agencies across the public sector that may deal directly or indirectly with emergency 
management and climate change adaptation. The agencies worked across areas such as 
emergency services, environmental management, social services, and justice. Some had 
been involved in the official inquiries into the case studies. In total, there were twenty two 
respondents, ten in Melbourne, seven in Perth and five in Brisbane, drawn from the senior 
executive to on-the-ground officers. These interviews refined the analysis of what was 
working well, what needed to change, what improvements could be made, and what barriers 
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there were to change. There was some consideration of the current state of risk-context 
analyses and the options for improvement via various reforms to governing institutions and 
tools. 
Stage four involved running workshops in Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane that utilised the 
outcomes of the interviews and the comparative analysis of the inquiry reports. The goal of 
these workshops was three-fold: (1) to provide an opportunity to identify anything that the 
previous research stages had missed; (2) to test proposals via the peer-review of 
practitioners; and, (3) to raise awareness and disseminate the findings of the project 
amongst key stakeholders. In total the workshops attracted twenty six participants: six in 
Perth, eleven in Melbourne, and nine in Brisbane. These participants included some 
individuals who had been interviewed in stage three, but most were new to the project. The 
range of stakeholders was broadened to include people from the community sector including 
volunteer and non-government organisations involved in assisting people who had been 
affected by disasters. Each participant was provided with a conference paper outlining the 
project and its preliminary findings (Howes, et al. 2012a) on their arrival at the venue. A 
summary report analysing all three workshops was sent to all participants following the 
workshops (Grant-Smith, et al. 2012). 
The final stage of this project was to analyse and disseminate the full research findings. This 
report is one of the publications produced and a summary of its key findings was presented 
to the Public Policy Network conference in Brisbane in January 2013 (Howes, et al. 2013). A 
presentation was also made at the NCCARF Flooding Forum for key stakeholders held in 
Brisbane on March 21 of 2013. In addition, a further four articles were drafted (one centred 
on each theme) and submitted to national and international academic journals.  
During the project a number of other opportunities were utilised for the peer-review of the 
research and the dissemination of preliminary findings. These included:  
• Presenting the research design to a meeting of lead investigators from NCCARF 
funded projects in Canberra on 9 May 2012;  
• Making a presentation on the project’s progress to the NCCARF conference in 
Melbourne on 27 June 2012; and,  
• Presenting a paper of the preliminary findings to the Australian Political Studies 
Association annual conference in Hobart on 26 September 2012 (Howes, et al. 2012a).  
A brief article based on the first two stages of the project was submitted to the Australian 
Journal of Emergency Management in June 2012 (Howes, et al. 2012b) and a paper was 
submitted to the Urban Research Program in October 2012 for on-line publication as an 
issues paper (Howes, et al. 2012c). The team is also working on the development of an 
executive briefing note that might be used by senior decision makers within the public sector. 
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4. THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONTEXT 
Integrating disaster risk management and climate change adaptation policy taps into two key 
issues regarding the nature of government in Australia. First, is the institutional architecture 
of the system of government that gives rise to jurisdictional disputes and makes a whole-of-
government response more difficult. Second, is the dispute over the nature of policymaking 
and whether it can realistically adopt a rational comprehensive response, or if it is limited to 
making incremental changes. Both these issues are evident in the current arrangements for 
disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. 
4.1 The Australian system of government  
Beck (1992) pointed out that the main institutions of modern government were created in the 
nineteenth century and were not designed to address current complex environmental issues. 
The oldest environmental agencies only date back to the early 1970s, and climate change 
organisations did not emerge until the late 1980s (Howes 2005). The Australian system of 
government is a case in point. It was shaped by a constitution drafted in the 1890s by a 
group of independent colonies that were reluctant to cede power to a new national 
government. The result was a compromise that blended institutions from the USA and UK 
into what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Washminster mutation’ (named after the 
governments of Washington and Westminster) (Jaensch 1997; Thompson 1980). Local 
governments were not mentioned in the constitution and exist entirely at the mercy of state 
governments that were formed from the pre-existing colonies (Howes & Dedekorkut-Howes 
2012). Climate change and disaster risk management were simply not on the political 
agenda when these institutions were created, so there is no mention of them in the 
constitution.  
The underlying dynamic of the Australian political system is an on-going vertical power 
struggle between the three tiers of government. This has been particularly fierce when it 
comes to complex issues related to the environment that cut across local, state and national 
boundaries (Howes 2005; Toyne 1994). There have, however, been some moves to improve 
collaboration between levels through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and a 
range of joint councils (Howes & Dedekorkut-Howes 2012).  
In addition to the vertical power struggles, there have been corresponding horizontal rivalries 
between different organisations within each level. Governments have traditionally divided up 
their responsibilities into discrete areas, such as emergency services, the environment, 
public health, housing, infrastructure, business, and agriculture, etc. This strict demarcation 
has led to a ‘silo mentality’ within organisations that encourages a narrow view of issues 
within their purview and tends to overlook the broader or cross-agency implications. 
Furthermore, there is the risk of ‘turf wars’ as responsibilities and resources are jealously 
guarded because other organisations are seen as competitors (Liebrecht & Howes 2006). 
These kinds of rivalries are exacerbated by issues such as climate change and disaster risk 
management that cut across defined areas of responsibility (Productivity Commission 2012; 
APSC 2007). A flood or a bushfire, for example, will have implications not only for the 
emergency services that need to provide the immediate response, but will also require the 
intervention of other government organisations to provide health care, housing, financial 
assistance, and repairs to infrastructure. In recent years there have been moves to improve 
cooperation and coordination in Queensland, for example, at the regional level, with joint 
8 Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation  
 
bodies being established between various agencies and local government to coordinate the 
delivery of services (Rolfe, et al. 2009; Howes 2006). This was extended by the creation of 
the Queensland Reconstruction Authority after the 2011 Queensland floods. 
4.2 Policymaking 
While the governing institutions at the heart of the Australian political system set the stage, 
the policymaking processes within them direct the behaviour of the actors. These processes 
have a strong formal component that is embodied in public sector rules and procedures but 
there is some debate as to how they might best be described. Perhaps the most popular 
view is that of the ‘policy cycle’ which characterises policymaking as a series of logical steps: 
issue identification; policy analysis; policy instruments; consultation; coordination; decision; 
implementation; and, evaluation. At the end of the evaluation step, any issues that are 
revealed or remain unresolved start the next turn of the cycle (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 
2007). Critics of this view argue that policymaking is not as logical or clear cut and point out 
that even the proponents of this model have admitted that it is more of an ideal than a 
definitive explanation of practice (Colebatch 2005). The idea of a logical step by step process 
remains influential in many policies, plans and decision-making routines. Notwithstanding the 
attraction of the policy cycle, one of the ongoing debates is whether the process should 
proceed via giant leaps (the rational comprehensive school) or small steps (incrementalism).  
The rational comprehensive approach conceives policymaking as rational, balanced, 
objective and analytical process in which decisions are made in a series of stages starting 
with identification of the problem or issue and ending with the implementation of a solution. 
The approach advocated by this model implies that all possible options are considered in 
detail and that one alternative is chosen over others entirely on merit thus effectively 
discounting the influence of political and other external factors (Productivity Commission 
2012). Critics of the rational comprehensive approach consider it to be based on an 
unrealistic ideal, noting that such comprehensiveness is rarely possible in practice. Adequate 
information is rarely available and ‘problems are often just redefined or partially addressed, 
rather than solved, allowing them to re-emerge (Handmer & Dovers 2007; Sutton 1999). 
There have also been criticisms of the step-wise approach and of the assumption that policy 
formulation and implementation can be separated (Heazle 2010; Bell 2002; Neiman & 
Stambough 1998; Sutton 1999). What if a problem is not easy to define? What if there are 
clashing goals and objectives? What if policymakers are not aware of all the options 
available? What if the costs and benefits cannot easily or accurately be calculated? What if 
policymakers and planners are influenced by factors such as ideas, economic interests, 
political ideology, discourses or values and so fail to optimise the cost-benefit ratio?  
Incrementalism, the main competitor to the rational comprehensive model, was proposed in 
the 1950s by researchers such as Charles Lindblom who acknowledged that policymakers 
have to deal with imperfect or incomplete information about issues and options (Lindblom 
1979). He believed that democratic systems tend to resist radical change and that a strategy 
of incremental change through small steps could allow policy makers to address parts of 
larger problems using familiar tools and drawing on their past experience. While critics of this 
theory argue that such an approach makes substantial improvements to society impossible, 
Lindblom suggested that over time these steps could build into significant changes. While 
this view of policymaking is perhaps more realistic than the rational comprehensive model, it 
is less than optimal and does not provide a strategic way forward because it only considers a 
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small number of alternatives for dealing with a problem and tends to choose options that 
differ only marginally from existing policies (Handmer & Dovers 2007).  
Attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both the rational comprehensive and incremental models 
have given rise to hybrid approaches that offer an iterative or sequential approach to policy 
development and implementation (Dror 1964). These have the capacity to adopt an 
institutional learning cycle that utilises the on-the-ground knowledge of key stakeholders to 
drive policy changes. Indeed it has been suggested that responding to problems like climate 
change require such a sequential or iterative decision-making approach because it allows 
“decisions to be made and revised repeatedly over time in response to new knowledge, 
accumulated experience, or changed conditions” (Parson & Karwat 2011:744). This might 
include new scientific knowledge about climate change and associated impacts, changes in 
technologies, or changes in goals and priorities. 
Although complex interlinked issues like climate change and disaster risk management 
appear at face value to be well suited to a rational comprehensive policy, the uncertainty 
inherent in the knowledge of local risks and the clash of values between stakeholders 
renders this model unworkable in practice (Heazle 2010). On the other hand, the issues and 
challenges they present are so pressing their resolution requires more rapid and substantial 
changes than an incremental approach can deliver. Perhaps the best hope lies in the 
adoption of a sequential, iterative approach that develops a growing body of risk-context 
analyses and learns from experimentation with different policy/planning tools. Questions of 
how this might cope with uncertainty, the clash of values, and whether it can deliver the 
needed changes in time would still need to be resolved.   
4.3 Climate change adaptation policies 
The preceding sections have elucidated three elements of the policy problem. First, climate 
change has profound policy implications for Australia, particularly with regards to adaptation, 
and has been characterised as a ‘wicked’ problem. Second, although an integrated response 
is needed, the Australian institutional context discourages collaboration across and within 
levels of government. Third, there remains considerable disagreement about whether the 
policymaking process can generate the scale and speed of change required. All three 
elements have manifest themselves in current responses to climate change adaptation.  
The National Climate Change Adaptation Framework (COAG 2007) is the touchstone for 
coordinating climate adaptation policies across the three levels of government in Australia. It 
was developed by COAG in 2007 to improve understanding of the problem, build adaptive 
capacity and reduce vulnerability. It was accompanied by the creation of the National Climate 
Change Adaptation Research Facility and identified priority areas of action in: water 
resources; coastal regions; biodiversity; agriculture, fisheries and forestry; human health; 
tourism; settlements, infrastructure and planning; and, natural disaster management.  
In 2009 the Australian Department of Climate Change released Climate Change Risks to 
Australia’s Coasts: A first pass national assessment (DCC 2009) that provided all levels of 
government with some indication of the key risks to coastal settlements. This was followed in 
2010 by the Commonwealth’s Adapting to Climate Change in Australia: An Australian 
Government Position Paper (DCC 2010) acknowledging that responsibility for adaptation is 
shared by all levels of government, business and the community. While the Commonwealth 
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saw itself as playing a leading role in some areas, it was made clear that most of the heavy 
lifting would have to be done by the other levels of government.  
In 2011 the Productivity Commission investigated the barriers to climate change adaptation 
at the request of the Commonwealth government. This resulted in the release of an Issues 
Paper (Productivity Commission 2011) followed by a Draft Report (Productivity Commission 
2012), both of which saw climate change as a market failure and stressed the need for 
market solutions. In 2011 the Commonwealth created the Climate Commission to inform the 
public debate about climate change through a series of reports.  
At the State level, climate change adaptation policies and plans are undergoing some 
significant revisions. In October 2012, for example, the West Australian government released 
a new policy statement entitled Adapting to Our Changing Climate (GWA 2012) that showed 
how rainfall in the south-west of the state had declined since 1950 and discussed bushfire 
prevention, early warning, control and defence. The Victorian government is required by its 
Climate Change Act 2010 to develop a Climate Change Adaptation Plan every four years. 
The first plan was released in March 2013 and included a chapter on the increased risk of 
disasters with specific references to the 2009 bushfires (State Government of Victoria 2013). 
While Queensland developed some climate change policies that dealt with adaptation under 
the Bligh government, (including ClimateQ: Toward a Greener Queensland and the Draft 
South East Queensland Climate Change Management Plan) many of these policies were 
never fully implemented and the election of the Newman government in 2012 shifted the 
policy focus away from climate change (Norman 2012). 
At the local government level, the Department of Climate Change ran a Local Adaptation 
Pathways Program that provided grants to local councils for developing their own adaptation 
plans (the list of participating councils included several from Western Australia, Victoria and 
Queensland). In addition, eighty seven local councils in Australia are members of the 
network of International Councils for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Local 
Governments for Sustainability that has several voluntary programs on climate change 
adaptation. As with state governments, policies and plans at the local level are in a state of 
flux (Norman 2012). The Gold Coast City Council, for example, had developed a Climate 
Change Strategy that included adaptation in 2009 but by late 2012 it was making cuts to its 
climate change department (Killoran 2012). 
4.4 Disaster Risk Management 
Australia has an array of legislation, organisations, financial instruments, and coordination 
mechanisms designed to manage disasters that include multi-tiered institutional 
arrangements and formal coordination forums (World Bank & QRA 2011). In general these 
arrangements, along with a high coping capacity (primarily a function of income, savings and 
insurance), ensure that although disaster events may cause extensive damage, mortality 
rates are generally low and communities are able to recover relatively quickly (O'Brien, et 
al..2006). The challenge is how the system will cope in future as climate change increases 
the frequency, duration and/or intensity of disasters caused by extreme weather events 
(IPCC 2012; Productivity Commission 2012).  
There have been considerable efforts to improve collaboration between agencies and 
develop a more consistent national response amongst the different levels of government. 
COAG has again played a key role supported by the joint ministerial Standing Committee on 
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Police and Emergency Management and the National Emergency Management Committee 
(that is made up of the Directors-General of the relevant departments) and its sub-
committees (comprising officers from the key agencies). 
The Commonwealth, through the Attorney-General’s Department and Emergency 
Management Australia, has sought to facilitate a national approach to disaster risk 
management by maintaining a constructive dialogue between the states and territories on 
issues of national importance (EMA 2000; Pitman 2006). This has encouraged the adoption 
of an all hazards, all agencies, prepared community approach to disaster risk management 
as well as the standard policymaking model of Prevent-Prepare-Respond-Recover (PPRR). 
Two key policies used by all governments are the Australian Emergency Management 
Handbook and Manuals and the National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines (NERAG) 
(2010). Funding can be sourced from the National Disaster Resilience Program and the 
National Disaster Response and Recovery Arrangements. 
In Queensland, there is the Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (2010), the 
Disaster Management Act 2003 and Public Safety Preservation Act 1986. Coordination is 
handled by the State Disaster Management Group (2011) (made of the state departmental 
Directors-General) with three subgroups dealing with disaster coordination, recovery and 
mitigation respectively. In the aftermath of the severe flooding 2010-11 and cyclone Yasi, the 
Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA) (2011) was established to coordinate and 
implement recovery efforts. In Western Australia, the Fire and Emergency Services Authority 
(FESA) was the lead agency operating under the West Australian Emergency Management 
Policy. In the aftermath of the Perth Hills bushfires, FESA has been restructured into a 
department. Victoria has its own Emergency Management Act 1986 and Emergency 
Management Manual Victoria. In the past the lead agency was the Office of the Emergency 
Services Commissioner but after a policy review it was announced that a new organisation, 
Emergency Management Victoria, will become the lead coordinating organisation 
(Government of Victoria 2012). 
At the local level, councils have an important role to play in disaster planning and response 
but many have limited capacity to deal with major disasters without the support of state 
agencies. The Queensland government has District Disaster Management Groups and Local 
Disaster Management Groups to coordinate efforts at the local and sub-regional level. 
Similar arrangements operate in Western Australia. Relationships between state and local 
governments in Victoria are currently being reviewed (Government of Victoria 2012). 
4.5 Summary and the next steps 
Any attempt to integrate disaster risk management and climate change adaptation 
policy/planning into a whole-of-government approach will face several challenges. First, 
Australia has a three tiered federal system of government that tends to encourage rivalries 
between and within the federal, state and local levels. Second, while these policy issues may 
appear to need a rational comprehensive solution, the practical policymaking response is 
more likely to be incremental or iterative. Third, there is a patchwork of constantly shifting 
priorities, partially overlapping policies, and sometimes competing organisations. There are, 
however, some promising opportunities. COAG and its associated organisations, for 
example, has played an significant role in developing a consistent national approach to both 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk management, as well as encouraging 
12 Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation  
 
cooperation between and within different levels of government. Further, there has been a 
strong, effective and positive policy response to disaster risk management across the country 
in the light of recent extreme weather-related events that has enabled the rapid mobilisation 
of considerable resources. What is needed is to generate the same enthusiasm for action on 
climate change adaptation.  
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5. BACKGROUND ON THE CASE STUDIES 
As stated previously, the case studies of the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the 2011 Perth Hills 
bushfires and the 2011 Brisbane floods were selected for this project for three key reasons. 
First, while climate scientists are reluctant to attribute individual events to climate change, 
these cases offer examples of the kinds of disasters that are likely to become more frequent, 
intense and/or prolonged. Second, these cases put extreme pressure on the organisations, 
policies and plans outlined in the previous section, hence offering the opportunity to identify 
what works well and what needs to change. Third, these cases involved three different state 
governments that are geographically dispersed across the continent (from north to south and 
east to west) which gives the research findings national implications. 
Major bushfires are not unusual events in the Victorian landscape and, since 1939, post-fire 
inquiries have sought to improve understanding of their drivers and impacts and of reducing 
their likelihood and consequences. Investigations into the 1983 ‘Ash Wednesday’ fires in 
particular generated the central tenet of the Victorian Bushfire Policy, colloquially known as 
‘prepare and stay or leave early’. Between 1983 and the fires of February 2009, research 
repeatedly reinforced the general conclusion that a well-prepared property can be readily 
defended by (physically and emotionally) well-prepared people. On 7 February 2009 (‘Black 
Saturday') much of south-eastern Australia experienced extreme fire weather conditions. The 
fires were preceded by an eleven year drought and occurred during an extreme heatwave, 
with several localities across Victoria recording their highest temperatures since records 
began in 1859 (BOM 2009). On the day, the Country Fire Authority (CFA) and the 
Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) attended 316 fires, of which 15 caused 
(or had the potential to cause) the greatest damage, with five fires claiming the lives of 173 
people, 2133 houses, and many other assets (VBRC 2010b). These fires tested every aspect 
of Victoria’s fire management sector and governance with the subsequent Royal Commission 
inquiry report making sixty seven recommendations for change across the entire PPRR 
policy spectrum. The Terms of Reference for the Royal Commission included: the causes of 
the fires; preparation and planning; all aspects of the response; the provision of essential 
services; land use planning; fire-proofing buildings; emergency management; public 
communication; and, training, infrastructure and resources (VBRC 2010a:38-40).   
In Western Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) noted that “2010 was one of the 
driest and hottest years on record across the Perth Metropolitan area,” with annual rainfall 
totals “generally 40 to 50% lower than normal” (GWA 2011:55). In November of that year, the 
Minister for Emergency Services told Parliament that “Western Australia was facing one of its 
worst bushfire seasons in history” and that “large parts of Western Australia faced an above 
normal fire risk due to increased fuel loads from dry bush and grasslands” which could result 
in “early season bushfires that are fast moving and extremely challenging for fire-fighters to 
control” (GWA 2011:55). On 6 February 2011 a fire was ignited in the front yard of a private 
property by an off-duty police officer who was allegedly operating an angle grinder while 
undertaking metalwork at his home. With a drought factor of 10 (meaning that all fuels are 
dry and ready to burn) the peak wind gusts at the fire site were estimated to have been 
between 70 and 80km/h. The resulting bushfire destroyed 71 homes and damaged a further 
39 homes in the Roleystone-Kelmscott area of the Perth Hills in Western Australia (GWA 
2011:3, 56, 82).	  On 23 February 2011 the Perth Hills Bushfire Inquiry, also called the ‘Special 
Inquiry’ was announced by the Western Australian Premier and lead by Mick Keelty (former 
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Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police). The Special Inquiry focused on the theme of 
a ‘shared responsibility’ between all stakeholders for the management of risk and 
vulnerability as it relates to fuel loads. On 17 August 2011 the report of the inquiry was 
publicly released with a total of 101 submissions and 55 recommendations. The report 
identified the Fire and Emergency Services Authority (FESA) as a key constraint for 
achieving an effective share of responsibilities between all parties (GWA 2011:3-9).	  The 
Terms of Reference for the Special Inquiry focussed on the following issues of interest: 
prevention and mitigation activities; laws, practices and policy impacts; risk management and 
enforcement; information/communication/education; and, coordination (GWA 2011:194). 
In Queensland, as a result of an unusually strong La Nina event and prolonged intense 
monsoonal rainfall, extreme flooding occurred in the Brisbane River valley and surrounding 
areas from late 2010 to early 2011. The flooding resulted in the deaths of 35 people, and an 
estimated $5 billion worth of damage. The La Nina event in question and its associated 
rainfall were forecast by the Bureau of Meteorology, which briefed the Queensland 
government of the threat in advance of the floods. As a result of these events, the 
Queensland government established a Commission of Inquiry into the floods. These events 
occurred in the context of a history of extreme floods in the Brisbane area, and were 
preceded by prolonged drought in the State of Queensland between 2001 and 2009. The 
Commission of Inquiry gave considerable attention to the operation of dams during the 
flooding and, in particular, Wivenhoe Dam's operation as a flood mitigation facility. Both flood 
mitigation and water supply in the region are managed via a series of dams on the Brisbane 
River that control the flow of water according to the level of priority given to either policy 
objective. The Commission's expert hydrologist estimated that the dams contributed only part 
of the Brisbane flooding with the remainder entering the Brisbane River downstream of the 
dams during the events of January 2011 (QFCI 2012:524). The other principle concern of the 
Commission’s investigation related to the adequacy and implementation of Queensland's 
planning and disaster risk management systems.	  	  
The reports from the three official inquiries into these events were analysed and compared to 
the literature on disaster risk management. The result was the identification of four recurrent 
themes.  
First, there is a need to improve interagency communication and collaboration. This is clearly 
important for all organisations dealing with disaster risk management, but it could also be 
extended to include agencies dealing with climate change adaptation, hence facilitating a 
greater integration of the two policy areas.  
Second, there is a need to develop institutional arrangements that support continual 
improvement and policy learning. As climate change is going to impact on the exposure of 
people to disasters, so climate agencies would need to share information with the emergency 
services in order to improve their institutional learning.  
Third, there is a need to improve community engagement and communication. This includes 
improving the level of understanding of current vulnerabilities to disasters and how these 
risks are likely to vary as the climate changes.  
Finally, there is a need to refocus attention on resilience. Actions taken to improve resilience 
to the impacts of climate change may also help to improve resilience to disasters and vice 
versa. The themes therefore offer not only the opportunity to improve disaster risk 
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management but also provide points where there may be some integration with climate 
change adaptation. Each theme was investigated further by conducting semi-structured 
interviews and workshops with key stakeholders in Perth, Melbourne and Brisbane. The 
stakeholders included people involved with both disaster risk management and climate 
change adaptation. The findings of this research are presented in the following sections. 
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6. INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION & COLLABORATION1 
6.1 The literature and inquiry reports 
Over the last two decades many of the top-down, hierarchical, command-and-control 
approaches to policy have been replaced by more collaborative models that reflect “a more 
dynamic and flexible network model that facilitates multiorganizational, intergovernmental, 
and intersectoral cooperation” (Waugh & Streib 2006:131). This is certainly the case in 
Australia where disaster risk management arrangements are formed around an interagency 
and intergovernmental approach spanning all three levels of government and working closely 
together with volunteers, non-government organisations, businesses and the community. 
This shift also reflects an increasing understanding that disaster risk management, like 
climate change adaptation; deals with problems that are not easily solved. Further, both are 
addressed by separate communities of policymakers, practitioners and researchers who 
often use different words for similar issues and ideas (Mitchell, et al. 2010:20).  
The Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission found that the “operational response was hindered 
by difference between agencies’ systems, processes and procedures” (VBRC 2010a:18) and 
“true integration was not achieved” (VBRC 2010a:8). The special inquiry into the Perth 
bushfires concluded that “optimum coordination of available resources to fight the Perth Hills 
fires of 5 and 6 February 2011 was not provided” and stated that the reason was a failure to 
“properly consult and coordinate” (GWA 2011:133). The report on the Queensland floods 
recommended better communication and cooperation between major infrastructure providers 
(such as power, water, and dam operators) as well as emergency services, state government 
departments and local councils (QFCI 2012:28). Goode, et al. (2012:17), in their review that 
includes these cases, note that each agency has its own specialised knowledge in relation to 
specific risks and that there is a lack of understanding between these “silos of knowledge”. 
All three inquiries highlighted to need clarify roles and responsibilities, improve coordination 
and leadership arrangements, and bolster interagency communication. 
Disaster risk management requires the ability of government officials to interact effectively 
with each other and the broader community (Waugh & Streib 2006:131). Effective 
interagency communication and collaboration is essential for delivering a coordinated all 
hazards, all agency approach as advocated by Emergency Management Australia and state 
governments. Improved networking, cooperation, collaboration and cooperation has the 
potential to deliver a range of benefits in both disaster management and climate change 
contexts relating to the building of interagency trust, improved information exchange, 
collaborative decision-making, risk sharing and pooling limited resources to achieve common 
goals. These points apply equally to climate change adaptation (APSC 2007; Head 2008; 
Garnaut 2008) and environmental policy in general (Ross & Dovers 2008). 
                                                
1	  The	  views	  expressed	  in	  sections	  6	  to	  10	  of	  this	  report	  are	  those	  of	  the	  respondents.	  They	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
represent	  the	  views	  of	  the	  authors.	  




The interviews conducted during this project found overwhelming support for the need to 
improve interagency communication and collaboration, echoing both the official inquiry 
reports and the findings of the literature review. As one respondent stated, “it's working in 
partnership, recognising the skills of the various agencies and how they can actually 
complement each other but having a common goal” (West Australian government official 3). 
There was also broad recognition that climate change has major implications for disaster risk 
management and that any improvements should encompass organisations addressing both 
policy issues. As one Victorian interviewee put it “you do not find many climate change 
sceptics on the end of hoses anymore ... they are dealing with increasing numbers of fires, 
increasing rainfall events, increasing storm events” (Victorian government official 10). One of 
the Queensland interviewees suggested that this collaboration should extend to cover all 
levels of government and other sectors: “I think it's state government's responsibility to 
ensure that there is a framework in place to enable, whoever it is, whether it's local 
government, or if it's industry, enable them with the tools and equip them with the tools to be 
able to deliver on it” (Queensland government official 2). 
Several key barriers to interagency communication and collaboration emerged in both the 
interviews and workshops. One was the ‘silo mentality’ where staff are so focussed on their 
particular arena of action that they fail to see the broader implications of their work for other 
agencies and miss where the efforts of other agencies might be helpful to them. West 
Australian government official 4 stated that until climate change “becomes relevant to my 
sphere of work - tangibly relevant - it won't make it a speck of difference.” Communicating 
across different types of expertise was another barrier because different professionals often 
do not ‘speak the same language’. A third issue was the problem of ‘turf wars’, where staff 
saw other agencies as competitors and so guarded their knowledge, powers and resources. 
Another problem was the lack of trust, particularly where there were antagonistic relations 
between key stakeholders and/or a history of personal dislike. Finally, there was the issue of 
the ‘message from the top’, where the executive and/or government do not place a high 
priority on interagency communication and collaboration. These factors have also come up in 
previous research into collaborative governance (see, for example, Rolfe, et al. 2009; Howes 
2008; Liebrecht & Howes 2006).  
Participants in this project suggested that such barriers are exacerbated by a lack of shared 
vision, fragmented legislation or policies, institutional structures that discourage 
collaboration, organisational cultures that encourage staff to distance themselves from other 
agencies, and a lack of a shared knowledge base. West Australian government official 5, for 
example, argued that “there would have to be a lot more dialogue between researchers and 
specialists and what are essentially blue-collar operational people.” The participants also 
suggested that these barriers could be broken down by building social capital across 
organisations, but the challenge lay in how this might be achieved. This challenge was 
particularly evident when considering how to get significantly different types of agencies to 
work together, such as those involved in disaster risk management as opposed to climate 
change adaptation.  
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“We all - all organisations really need to be thinking about how their policies, 
programs, asset management, decision-making is climate-sensitive and to what 
extent climate change impacts may influence them and think about those and 
incorporate those into their thinking, along with all the other drivers and changing 
things that they need to take into account” (West Australian government official 1). 
6.3 Workshops 
Collaboration within and between tiers of government was seen as important by the 
overwhelming majority of participants in all three workshops. It was noted that the somewhat 
artificial distinction between the operational aspects of emergency management (e.g. 
response) and the more human aspects (e.g. recovery) is a significant barrier to 
collaboration. There is a lack of communication, a lack of shared understanding, a lack of 
shared goals, a lack of shared language, and ‘turf protection’. It was suggested that this is 
not because people don’t want to work together but it is more due to the demarcation of 
responsibilities and the management of these responsibilities. It was agreed that there was a 
need to challenge the ingrained culture of certain agencies. Role clarity and role 
complementarity, trust and shared goals based on ongoing contact and networking, 
information sharing and open communication were believed to be keys to effective 
collaboration. It should be noted that these issues are not unique to the disaster risk 
management or climate change sectors. The need for informal communication as a 
complementary activity to formal communication and collaborative efforts (such as taskforces 
and inter-departmental working groups) was emphasised. 
The key themes around improving interagency collaboration and capitalising on the strengths 
of existing approaches centred on: 
• The importance of role clarity and shared goals; 
• Political and executive support for collaboration; and, 
• Emphasising regional and local approaches to collaboration. 
6.3.1 The importance of role clarity and shared goals 
Participants argued that existing emergency management models such as PPRR do not 
adequately consider the roles of different agencies and the community. While it was 
generally agreed that improved role clarity for agencies across the different PPRR phases 
(not just in response) would support collaboration, it was also recognised that support 
agencies (police, child protection, etc.) are already experienced in recognising 
responsibilities, filling gaps, and working across hazards, and seem very willing to do so. 
Language/terminology difficulties were seen as real barriers which can affect interoperability 
and collaboration opportunities. For instance the PPRR model may be popular within the 
emergency management community but it does not necessarily resonate with or reflect the 
priorities of the community or human services sectors.  A common platform of shared goals 
based on a common language and understanding borne out of dialogue and collaboration 
was seen to be one of the key benefits and pre-conditions of increased collaboration. 
6.3.2 Political and executive support for collaboration 
Participants observed that many practitioners were willing to work more collaboratively but 
senior officer commitment can be difficult to achieve. This may be a function of political 
pressure, the need for control, the availability of funding and other resources, risk aversion, 
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or concerns about accountability. Further, because the staff time and resources required are 
often not accounted for, collaborative efforts rely heavily on the existing goodwill, 
relationships and the enthusiasm of individual officers. Potential strategies for facilitating 
improved collaboration included: 
• A clear message from the top (at every level of government) that everyone will work 
together to breakdown existing cultural and historical barriers and work more 
collaboratively; 
• The promotion of collaboration champions; and, 
• The broadening of committee membership to include non-government interests. 
Leadership in social and cultural alignment involved finding the common ground and 
synergies through: acceptance of differences; recognition of various skills; demonstrations of 
how this is relevant to them; inclusion of a conciliatory decision-making style that includes 
other people in decisions; open dialogue; and an openness to admitting and dealing with 
mistakes. Increments for maintaining momentum of cultural changes include: common 
understandings; action plans; flexibility between steps; incentives to drive it; funding and 
collaboration opportunities; and the will and structure to collaborate. Disarming 
defensiveness will require strong leadership. 
Participants reported that success stories in promoting effective collaboration are often linked 
to a passionate and committed champion. Champions are the ones who get collaborative 
meetings up and running. Working together has relied heavily on existing goodwill, 
relationships and the enthusiasm of individual officers. Willingness among individuals and 
leadership to work together is important and personalities play a big part in getting this going. 
This has required informal communication and collaboration to make it work in practice. One 
of the measures of success is the confidence that people have in the organisation and its 
people. You can measure those things. It’s about creating hope. The biggest return is at 
regions and state level.  
6.3.3 Emphasising local and regional approaches to collaboration  
Participants emphasised the importance of local and regional approaches to collaboration. 
Local government was recognised as an important stakeholder because it has regular 
exposure to a range of disasters and detailed knowledge of local communities. It was noted, 
however, that local government boundaries are artificial political barriers that can confine 
collaborative efforts. There needs to be the ability to transcend existing boundaries in order 
to address issues.   
 
20 Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation  
 
7. INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT AND LEARNING 
7.1 The literature and inquiry reports 
All institutions of government have to respond to rapidly changing economic, social and 
environmental contexts. As a consequence they need to redesign their structures and 
procedures to enable continual improvement and policy learning. The Victorian Bushfires 
Royal Commission (2010c:81, 86, 229) promoted the need for agencies to learn from their 
experience and conduct more research into the level and distribution of risk. The Perth Hills 
bushfire report recommended a new set of institutional reviews, education and training (GWA 
2011:188), while the Brisbane floods inquiry recommended improving hydrodynamic 
modelling and forecasting to improve decision-making (QFCI 2011:24, 62). Goode, et al. 
(2012:16) note that each of these inquiries also highlighted a number of institutional issues 
associated with state emergency management arrangements.  
Part of the solution to these challenges requires innovative solutions that can be modified in 
the light of experience and on-the-ground feedback (ASPC 2007:1, 3). Effective disaster risk 
management requires imagination, initiative, a coordinated process for sharing learning and 
“a willingness to use information, however imperfect or incomplete to fuel action” (Waugh & 
Streib 2006:135). Successfully tackling these problems requires a broad acceptance and 
understanding from governments and Ministers that there are no quick fixes and that levels 
of uncertainty around the solutions need to be tolerated. Successfully addressing such 
problems takes time and resources and adopting innovative approaches may result in the 
occasional failure or the need for policy change or adjustment (APSC 2007:36). In order to 
be effective disaster risk management and climate adaptation need to be integrated into 
mainstream government operations and with each other. Furthermore, approaches require 
continuous review to encourage policy learning and improvement. Institutional arrangements 
which support this may include integrating climate adaptation into all phases of PPRR 
(Birkmann & von Teichman 2011). 
7.2 Interviews 
A number of interview participants highlighted the limitations of the PPRR model of disaster 
risk management. The lack of long-term follow-up in this model is a case in point.  It was 
suggested by Queensland government official 5 that the political focus on emergency 
management provisions only reaches adequate levels in the aftermath of an extreme event 
and that this focus quickly fades as the government’s attention switches to other priorities. As 
a result of the short time horizons of political priorities the lessons learned from these events 
were often stymied by an inability to use the recovery phase of the emergency management 
process to feed into preventative measures in an iterative way: 
“there's a window of opportunity after any major event in a place to say, this is what 
we have to embed in the corporate knowledge and understanding, …  We've only 
got this little window of opportunity to do that in, otherwise people forget. … the 
priorities get overtaken by the next most important thing” (Queensland government 
official 5). 
Interview participants were in general agreement that more and better data about climate risk 
would be helpful for ensuring more effective institutional responses. In this respect, 
participants appeared at times to be under the impression that certainty about the nature and 
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magnitude of climate change risks is possible. There was also recognition from some 
participants that effective emergency management was not always limited by a lack of risk 
data, and that the needs of communities to build resilience varied considerably: “it's not a one 
size fits all across the state.  To improve the resilience of one community will be very 
different to another community.” (Queensland government official 2). Although improved risk 
data was important, participants were in agreement that it is more important for institutions to 
understand the characteristics of community resilience and vulnerability, which vary 
considerably depending on location and the communities in question.   
Participants appeared to agree that the PPRR model did not adequately address the process 
of ensuring a common understanding of priorities and risks between emergency 
management institutions, nor the process of deliberating about what the best response 
should be. Explicitly addressing these issues would encourage a more effective process of 
institutional learning, but such an approach needed to be more inclusive of the public as well:  
“You need to have a conciliatory decision-making style that includes other people in 
your decisions. The people you're affecting need to be included in those decisions. 
They might not like the decision that's made, but they need to understand why 
they're being made and have some input into the decision, some ownership. You 
can't just impose policies” (West Australian government official 7). 
7.3 Workshops 
Workshop participants noted that institutional learning was vital to meeting the challenges 
posed by both climate change and emergency management. It was recognised that effective 
learning is based on the ability to reconceptualise problems. Participants suggested that true 
institutional learning requires a significant cultural shift and acknowledged that there can be 
limited space for learning in a high pressure environment. Space needs to be provided for 
reflection and learning from both mistakes and successes. Participants noted that the 
emergency management community does not integrate policy, education, learning and 
evaluation well because its culture is focussed on response and some highlighted the 
limitations of the PPRR model. 
The key themes around improving institutional learning centred on: 
• Learning from each other; and, 
• Models for learning. 
7.3.1 Learning from each other 
Participants believed that learning and positive change could be supported by a combination 
of formal and informal interactions between researchers, practitioners, policy makers and the 
broader community. Participants noted that practitioners from within the government and the 
community have a great deal of knowledge and experience that can be utilised. The concept 
of a community of practice network involving researchers, practitioners and policy makers to 
share ideas and knowledge was proposed. While some participants were enthusiastic about 
the potential contribution of researchers to improving practice, others argued that research 
does not necessarily improve practice but may just legitimise what practitioners already know 
and do. Participants suggested that in order to influence practice, researchers must ensure 
that their findings are presented and promoted in an accessible way for the emergency 
management community.  
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Some participants proposed that non-government organisations or electronic learning 
repositories could be used to facilitate collaboration and sharing of knowledge. It was 
suggested that such repositories should be accessible for researchers, practitioners and the 
broader community so they can contribute to, learn from, and facilitate, interagency and inter-
community learning, communication and collaboration. 
7.3.2 Models for learning 
Participants proposed that the government responses to dealing with water resource 
management issues during the long drought in all three states provided a model for 
community engagement, resilience, dealing with climate change, interagency collaboration 
and institutional learning. These examples could inform the emergency management and 
climate change adaptation communities. Good examples of community engagement to 
change behaviour were thought to be those associated with water restrictions, supply and 
storage, especially in relation to demand management. It was felt that although they were 
based on scientific information, these programs were generally relevant and accessible to 
the community because they avoided jargon and were well targeted and topical. Further, a 
high level of relevant public information (including scientific information) was made available 
regarding actual and projected water shortage and water usage, including daily information 
on dam levels and progress towards achieving water use targets.  
It was also felt that the level of government and agency commitment to providing ongoing 
funding and support contributed to this success. This was because it was not one-off or one 
season only and allowed the programs, strategies and funding to have a long-term focus and 
long-term goals. Participants believed that there was commitment at the highest level of 
government to address water issues, demonstrated by the formation of senior officers group 
working across agencies in a number of the jurisdictions considered. The long-term focus 
and high level commitment also facilitated the building of internal capacity and skills to deal 
with the issues and also allowed for water issues to become mainstreamed (i.e. become 
embedded in the core business and decision-making of agencies, local government, 
business and the community) and modified/enhanced over time based on learning. Unlike 
broader climate issues which are politically contested participants felt that there was general 
community, scientific and government agreement that water was in short and decreasing 
supply and that changes need to be made to current practices because all parties accepted 
that there was a high probability of water shortage regardless of the cause. Participants 
believed that targeted incentive programs (e.g. rebates for water tanks) helped to build and 
support resilience and to support changes in behaviour. 
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8. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION 
8.1 The literature and inquiry reports 
Responding to problems associated with disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation requires a whole-of-government approach that necessarily relies on a willingness 
to work across agency boundaries and in a devolved way with communities and businesses 
(Productivity Commission 2012; APSC 2007:36). Through their review of recent disaster 
inquiries, including the three we are analysing, Goode, et al. (2012:17-18) note that there is 
scope for improvement in community engagement particularly with respect to clearly 
communicating risks and hazards. Our own analysis of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission (VBRC) bore this finding out with repeated references to the need for better 
community engagement and communication appearing in its reports (VBRC 2010c:3, 31, 34, 
37, 230, 352). Similarly, it emerged in the report into the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires which 
extended the concept to include the shared responsibility for disaster risk management 
across sectors (GWA 2011:13, 46). It also appeared in the Queensland Floods Commission 
of Inquiry (QFCI) final report with regards to improving community preparedness and 
assisting local groups (QFCI 2012:118, 122). 
It is important that disaster risk management and climate adaptation do not narrowly focus 
their efforts on creating disaster-specific legislation, administrative arrangements and 
institutional structures. They must also enhance capacity at the grassroots or local level 
(O’Brien, et al. 2006:73) in ways that value the contributions of local knowledge and 
expertise, especially in terms of adapting general goals to specific local contexts (Dovers 
1998:9). Communities often do not make a distinction between disaster risk management 
and climate adaptation efforts (Gero, et al. 2012), so effectively engaging the community in 
understanding the challenges of both, as well as actively involving them in identifying 
possible solutions, is important. It is also important that issues are widely discussed by all 
relevant stakeholders in order to ensure an appreciation of their complexity (Productivity 
Commission 2012; APSC 2007:27). This may involve the adoption of a “more distributed and 
participatory approach” (Beck 2011:305) to defining problems that acknowledges how people 
experience risk, addresses what are essentially normative issues, and actively engages them 
in both defining and implementing potential solutions. This more flexible and inclusive 
approach would engage a wider range of political actors, experts and the public “in a shared 
enterprise of responsible knowledge making” (Beck 2011:305). The idea of shared 
responsibility in disaster planning, preparedness, response and recovery was particularly 
evident in both the Perth Hills and Victorian Bushfires inquiries (GWA 2011:13, 46; VBRC 
2010c:37). Unfortunately there can be limited detail as to how these commitments to 
increased public involvement might be put into practice (Burton & Mustelin 2011). 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the benefits that may be delivered by a more participatory 
approach could include more effective implementation of measures because they would be 
“well understood by affected communities who through involvement in their formulation and 
implementation enjoy some sense of ongoing ownership and control” (Dovers 1998:9). This 
is particularly important in the context of disaster risk management due to its heavy reliance 
on voluntarism and the need to foster mutual assistance arrangements among and between 
communities (Waugh & Streib 2006:131). Research has shown that greater inclusion and 
participation can deliver tangible benefits in terms of building resilient communities 
(Handmer, et al. 2011:8). However, a possible challenge to broader community engagement 
24 Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation  
 
is that it represents a potential challenge to epistemic (knowledge-based) communities and 
approaches, such as disaster risk management professionals (Dovers 1998:9). This was 
particularly evident in the Victorian and Perth Hills bushfires where there was sometimes a 
tension between the risk assessments of home owners and those of emergency managers 
(VBRC 2010c:37, 230; GWA 2011:13, 46).  
8.2 Interviews 
In general the interviewees saw the importance of good community engagement, particularly 
with regards to getting people to be better prepared for a disaster or the impacts of climate 
change. Many felt that there was room for improvement but they were sometimes uncertain 
on how this could be achieved.  
There was a general agreement that engagement should be more than just giving out 
information. “I don’t think it’s an educational program. I think it’s an awareness and mature 
talking about it” (Victorian government official 1). It may also require some sort of interaction 
with key agencies. “Well it means people being actively involved right across the state, not 
just in SES headquarters or CFA headquarters or regional offices” (Victorian government 
official 2). 
While it was recognised that a major disaster heightens public awareness temporarily, one of 
the key problems is maintaining community interest: 
“It's an issue of consistency and maintaining that and carrying the learning through. 
So [within] the community obviously interest waxes and wanes with the impact of 
different disasters. So you know if we had big bushfires there'll be a lot of interest in 
bushfire planning and bushfire emergency response. The event that we had hopefully 
means that there'll be a lot of interest in flooding for the next decade” (Queensland 
government official 1). 
There seemed to be a feeling that emergency management had had more success with 
community engagement than climate change.  
“I think on the emergency management side, there - seem to have done a reasonable 
amount of work there ... given the resources they've had, they've probably done quite 
well. ... But in other areas of climate change adaptation, there's certainly room for a 
greater commitment and greater effort and resources to be put into community 
engagement and other stakeholder engagement” (West Australian government 
official 1). 
While committing resources to community engagement is important, it is often difficult to 
communicate the implications of climate change science effectively. Despite this one 
interviewee optimistically suggested that:  
“as the community becomes more aware of climate change as a reality and it’s not 
tainted by political views, so it has a scientific basis to it, then I think they’re more 
amenable to take in their own protective measures and also working in better with 
local councils in the council risk management” (Queensland government official 5). 
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8.3 Workshops 
Workshop participants recognised that community engagement is resource intensive (in 
terms of time, money, skills, and people) and needs to be well designed to be successful. 
Participants suggested that community engagement often focussed on methods rather than 
goals. Instead, the focus should be on how to empower the community to be involved in 
decision-making processes in an informed way and to engage in actions that support their 
own resilience. Community engagement efforts must recognise, respect and value local 
knowledge. It should also identify priority areas where the risk is high and engagement is low 
and develop strategies to engage with these communities in a useful way to manage risks. 
While the process must also communicate any shifts in the risk profile that are likely to result 
from climate change, participants recognised that impacts at the local level are difficult to 
predict with certainty. Participants also recognised that while community engagement can 
unrealistically raise expectations of what governments can do, it also has the potential to 
open important channels for dialogue and shared understanding, which form the basis for 
developing collective strategies to manage risks. Indeed, many participants acknowledged 
the importance of being clear about the state’s ability to protect them from natural disasters 
and support their recovery and the opportunities presented by facilitating improved 
community resilience and self-reliance. 
Participants provided examples of good community engagement activities that had been 
conducted in the past (e.g. water conservation programs during the drought 2001-09). These 
included examples driven by government agencies, businesses, communities and 
volunteers. Some of the key features of these examples included: enthusiasm and support 
from the non-government sector and community groups; and, the provision of targeted 
activities delivered in a way that resonated with the audience because it was meaningful, 
relevant, encouraged participation and inspired action. 
The key themes around improving community engagement and capitalising on the strengths 
of existing approaches centred on: 
• Changing the way we engage with people (the ‘how’); 
• Supporting locally driven engagement and planning; 
• When engagement should occur; 
• Who should be engaged; 
• Supporting a broader all-hazards engagement focus; and, 
• The role of media in supporting engagement. 
8.3.1 Changing the way we engage with people 
It was recognised that examples of increased community engagement at the ground level by 
disaster risk management agencies represented a shift in understanding. This demonstrated 
that programs need to be more targeted and focussed to trial new community engagement 
methods and to adapt existing techniques. It was noted that this does not occur across the 
board and that some parts of the sector are resistant to change. 
Some participants noted the willingness in parts of the disaster risk management sector to 
trial new methods and to adapt existing techniques. It was also noted that the timing of 
community engagement activities is vital. Successful programs seized the advantages 
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offered by increased interest in post-disaster events. However, it was recognised that both 
community and emergency management resources are often stretched at this time.  
Examples of good community engagement practices included: 
• Voluntary advisory services provided by emergency management agencies or non-
government organisations to help people to develop personal preparedness plans (e.g. 
bushfire plans);  
• Holding more open public meetings (i.e. meetings that are open to anyone in the public 
rather than specific community groups) to discuss emergency management issues; 
• Engaging with the artistic community to assist in accessing a variety of people and 
getting the emergency management message out; 
• Making better use of the range of social media and new media; 
• Supporting on-line information and engagement activities with local and community-
based infrastructure and systems; 
• Using less technical language and jargon in communication, education and 
engagement materials; and, 
• Targeting engagement activities to different audiences/demographics to ensure that 
they are meaningful, relevant, encourage participation, and inspire action. 
8.3.2 Supporting locally driven community engagement and planning 
The use of high impact and cost-effective methods is important because current funding 
mechanisms are not supportive of sustained engagement. The expanded use of volunteers 
and other non-emergency management professionals to conduct engagement activities was 
seen as a positive trend in this regard. Examples included: 
• Increasing the use of volunteers and human services agencies to undertake community 
engagement and education activities including enlisting volunteers to undertake 
community door knock campaigns; 
• Increasing support for community driven emergency planning activities supported by 
relevant state agencies and the use of local community advocates to promote issues; 
and, 
• Using and connecting existing community networks. 
All of these suggestions, however, carry some risk as volunteers, community organisations 
and networks have limited resources and personnel. 
8.3.3 Defining who should be engaged 
A key challenge for improving community engagement was seen to be around defining who 
should be engaged. This included ensuring that marginalised or vulnerable groups and 
individuals (such as children, young people, and culturally and linguistically diverse members 
of the community) were not excluded and had adequate opportunity to participate and 
influence decisions. Issues were identified regarding how ‘community’ should be defined and 
how the use of municipal boundaries might encourage demarcation and artificial boundaries. 
8.3.4 Supporting a broader engagement focus 
A significant challenge of current approaches to community engagement was seen to be the 
tendency for agencies to focus activities narrowly on their own interests (e.g. bushfire) at the 
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expense of an all hazards approach. It was noted that because the community has a range 
of different interests and priorities, and do not experience hazards in isolation, engagement 
needs to be about all hazards at the local level. Participants suggested that it may be 
appropriate for emergency management agencies to consider opportunities to link into 
existing broader community engagement activities. It was also suggested that engagement 
activities needed to encompass preparation in addition to response measures.  
8.3.5 The role of media in supporting engagement  
Participants recognised the important role that traditional media can play in getting 
information out during response situations. It was felt, however, that the mainstream media 
often presents a very negative picture of emergency management with a focus on perceived 
‘failures’ rather than the successful avoidance of more extensive damage or loss of life. The 
limited opportunity to provide counter views may encourage communities and politicians to 
be influenced by a culture of blame. Participants suggested that media outlets needed to be 
more ethical when dealing with communities pre-, post- and during disasters and to treat the 
community with more respect. Participants believed that a greater engagement with social 
and new media might help to support a better informed community debate. It was also 
suggested that emergency management organisations need to be permitted to give out 
information more quickly during an event, even if there is a risk of being ‘half-right’. This 
would give the community the opportunity to take action, rather than waiting too long for 
perfect information. 
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9. A RENEWED FOCUS ON RESILIENCE 
9.1 The literature and inquiry reports 
It has been suggested that there is a “need to move emergency management approaches 
beyond a response-oriented focus on hazard mitigation to consider vulnerability reduction 
and community resilience” (Handmer, et al. 2011:16). This proposed shift needs to be 
considered alongside the current emergency management context which is often described 
as taking place in a cycle of four distinct phases of Prevent-Prepare-Respond-Recover 
(PPRR) broadly relating to the management of impacts before, during and after a disaster 
event. Although the emergency services have found the PPRR approach useful over many 
years, it has been criticised as setting up artificial barriers between elements, assuming that 
each may appear equally important (and to have equal weight in all circumstances), and that 
each must be considered and implemented in the same order. It has also been suggested 
that adopting the PPRR approach has focussed efforts on response and reactive 
considerations (Rogers 2011). Cronstedt (2002:12) suggests that this may be a “carry-over 
from the emergency management paradigm that focussed on the hazard rather than 
vulnerability” and the complex underlying drivers of vulnerabilities to various hazards. There 
is a move towards embracing the idea of community resilience as “a new driving principle” 
(Goode, et al. 2012:20).  
Although the use of the concept resilience has become increasingly prevalent in the 
emergency management sector in Australian in recent years (Handmer, et al. 2011:6) the 
inquiry reports demonstrate a lack of consensus on the definition of resilience in the disaster 
setting (VBRC 2010c:31, 34, 230; GWA 2011:13, 46; QFCI 2011:115, 118, 122). This finding 
is supported by the work of Goode, et al. (2012:20). It is also consistent with other policy 
domains, including climate adaptation, in which there is there is no clarity around “what 
resilience means, beyond the simple assumption that it is good to be resilient” (Davoudi 
2012:299). 
Contemporary Australian disaster risk management approaches generally recognise that the 
elements of PPRR are interactive clusters rather than stages conducted sequentially, with 
most policy approaches using PPRR simply as a convenient description of the different 
elements. However, while such an approach recognises a blending across the elements of 
the model it is somewhat less progressive in terms of its recognition of the importance of 
concepts like resilience. It has been suggested that effective disaster risk management 
demands a greater focus on resilience throughout all PPRR phases and that it cannot be 
properly addressed through reliance on response (Handmer & Dovers 2007:170), i.e. it 
needs a proactive, rather than reactive, approach. In 2011 the Australian Government 
released the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) (COAG 2011) which obliges 
disaster risk management organisations to recognise and attempt to address the idea of 
resilience including the community’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
disaster events. Prosser and Peters (2010:10) argue that the “whole-of-government 
approach to disaster resilience” as advocated by the NSDR “brings with it broader cross 
jurisdictional and cross departmental policy challenges. Not the least of which is the different 
understandings of resilience, which may be used by departments and policy makers.” They 
advise that the task is not so much about gathering consensus from these various viewpoints 
around a single definition or interpretation of the term resilience. Rather, it involves the 
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challenge of developing a “holistic approach” that generates a “common understanding that 
is robust enough to operate in different policy contexts” (Prosser & Peters 2010:10-11).  
Building community resilience to disasters will be critical to the success of future disaster risk 
management. The NSDR emphasises the important role that partnerships between the 
government, emergency service providers and the community play in building resilience and 
empowering communities to become self-reliant. However, while the importance of shared 
(but not equal) responsibility for hazard preparedness was evident in all of the case studies 
was this was not always achieved and there may be opportunities for significant 
improvement.  
9.2 Interviews 
Building community resilience is the “new driving principle” in disaster risk management, and 
there are at present tensions concerning a lack of consensus on its definition and the 
evidence-base for the efficacy of this new approach (Goode, et al. 2012: 20). The Royal 
Commission report on the Victorian bushfires was released in 2009 and both the Perth Hills 
and Queensland Flood Inquiry reports were released the same year as the NSDR in 2011. 
Goode, et al. (2012: 20) argue that three case studies therefore did not include NSDR 
priorities in their Terms of Reference. The Perth Hills Bushfire Review specifically noted that 
community resilience was “not necessarily obvious” at the time the Terms of Reference for 
the inquiry was prepared. But upon reflection, and due to the process of the inquiry, 
community resilience was identified as a missing but contributing factor for shared 
responsibility (GWA, 2011: 11-14). Further down the track, the Victorian government (2011) 
released the green paper: Towards a more resilient and safer Victoria. 
How to ‘share responsibility’ with communities continues to be contentious. For West 
Australian government official 7 community resilience is about “making sure that the people - 
the population shares the responsibility”. The interviewees reported that delegation and 
acceptance of responsibilities will apply to a wide and diverse range of organisations and 
members within communities, and as such, the ‘degree’ of shared responsibility will vary. 
Victorian government official 5 points out that shared responsibility “doesn't mean equal 
responsibility. I think that's important.”  
The resilience approach is also compounded by differences in meaning associated with 
‘community’ and ‘resilience’. As Queensland government official 2 argues that: “To improve 
the resilience of one community will be very different to another community”. For many 
interviewees resilience is about “community resourcefulness” (West Australian government 
official 5) and “community development and strength has got to be about building resilience; 
resilience to a whole range of things of which natural events are just one” (Victorian 
government official 6). For West Australian government official 3, the meaning of community 
resilience was expressed as: 
“How connected they are as a community. Whether they're just groups of people 
who live in that area but there's no connectedness or whether there are the 
social ties that actually bind people together”.  
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Researcher 1 noted that: “A resilient community is one which pulls together. A not so resilient 
community would be one that just evaporates and people go their own separate ways”. Many 
interviewees argued for enhancing individual and systemic abilities to adapt and be flexible in 
dealing with their particular issues: “we don't want to go back to where we were before the 
event. We want to learn from it and move on” (West Australian government official 6). It was 
widely acknowledged that people learn by experience, and that the experience of hardship 
and resilience go hand in hand. Our research findings demonstrated that the understanding 
of risk was inherently linked with the acquisition of ‘abilities’ and ‘capacities’ to make 
improvements. In light of this, the concern for community resilience in the face of climate 
impacts is articulated by West Australian government official 7: 
“If you want to adapt to climate change you've got to understand you're living in 
a bloody harsh environment. Western Australian bushfire environment is the 
toughest bushfire environment in the world... So we're going to get the fires and 
we're not hardening the community up for it.”   
Interviewees observed that a challenge for disaster risk reduction was that “people don’t 
generally like being told… what they shouldn’t do and what they should do” (Researcher 1) 
and that emergency services personnel “constantly encounter communities that aren't 
particularly well-prepared, despite all the messages and warnings and things like that” (West 
Australian government official 5). Interviewees also reported that unrealistic expectations 
within communities are commonplace noting that “in Australia, there's been a growing sense 
of entitlement, which has actually undermined the resilience that may have existed 50 years 
ago. People expect things, expect the Government to bail them out” (Victorian government 
official 5). For Queensland government official 3, this expectation is largely a result of 
improved emergency response: “We were… our own worst enemies in that we constantly 
improve out response such that we raise expectations that we’re always going to respond 
and that has a negative effect on building resilience.” West Australian government official 7 
articulates the struggle at hand with counteracting community non-engagement:  
“We're at a loss as to how you penetrate it. You've got to penetrate the 
community, give them the facts of where they are... We've tended to dis-
empower the community. I think we have to re-empower the community. Every 
time you take something off them that they can't do - like some Councils around 
Perth have said you can't burn anything off anymore, you've got to chip it or take 
it to the rubbish dump.  People don't burn their bush box off in the city. So 
they've been disempowered”.  
Conversely, other communities were identified as wanting the autonomy to make their own 
decisions and test their own resilience. Many interviewees agreed that resilience was based 
on people: ‘knowing each other’, ‘caring about their homes and families’ and local 
knowledge. Victorian government official 5 reported that: 
“It's not a question of Government not fulfilling its responsibilities. It's actually 
coming from communities often who are saying … this is our community, these 
are our lives, we...want to have a say over what happens and that applies … 
right across the whole model, including recovery at the end.”  
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The overriding message from all three inquiries was that improved education and 
engagement is needed to enable well-informed communities to develop their own effective 
adaptation and risk management strategies (Howes, et al. 2012a: 7). Throughout our 
research, interviewees raised concerns with the idea of ‘community’ and a potentially narrow 
application of this notion in the emergency management field. Approaches advocated by 
interviewees involved “getting out, talking, [and] much more on the ground interaction” (West 
Australian government official 6). West Australian government official 5 felt it was about: 
“spending time talking to landowners, visiting community events, not hand[ing] 
out pamphlets in the community education type sense, but to be talking to 
people about community matters in a way that builds that trust and build that 
relationship”.  
Many interviewees argued that existing emergency management models such as PPRR do 
not adequately consider the roles of community or resilience at different phases and how to 
better involve them. Implications for the PPRR model included a greater emphasis on 
adaptive capacity and resilience building. West Australian government official 4 stated that 
this involved “a return to the risk management model which focuses on: 1) what are you 
trying to achieve given the context? 2) what will stop you from achieving that? and, 3) what 
are the best things we can do to treat that?” 
Many interviewees agreed that disaster risk reduction practitioners require longer-term 
horizons which incorporate conceptualisations of resilience and community that are not over-
simplified. This would build robustness into the patchwork of ‘community resilience’.  Viewing 
communities and their resilience as a patchwork of elements and dynamics avoids over-
simplifications and highlights more targeted pathways for building and mobilising 
communities for disaster resilience.  
9.3 Workshops 
In the workshops participants suggested that emergency management agencies in the past 
have tended to focus more on the immediate response to an event and less on preparation 
and long-term adaptive recovery. This is starting to change with agencies and the community 
beginning to consider the idea of resilience. Participants proposed that resilience needs to be 
understood as a social system — not just individuals or households — and needs to be seen 
as something much broader than disaster risk reduction.  
Participants suggested that resilience which already exists within community groups needed 
to be recognised and supported. In terms of community-based resilience, getting back to 
informal relationships outside government control was seen as important and highlighted the 
need for basic human interactions. Discussions on youth resilience highlighted the 
importance of social media as a form of communication. There was also recognition of the 
need for business to be a part of the solution and the importance of economic and social 
networks.   
While the resilience of the community, as well as disaster risk management organisations, 
were seen as important in responding to climate change and disasters, there was a 
perception that efficiency, economic growth and fiscal discipline were given a higher priority 
by government. This was reflected by a preoccupation with quantifying the economic costs 
and benefits of programs and proposals. Participants questioned whether an economic 
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argument that focused on both the immediate and longer-term could be used to support 
approaches which address resilience issues.  
In summary, the key themes that emerged with regards to improving resilience and 
capitalising on the strengths of existing approaches centred on: 
• Recognising the contribution of volunteers and community groups to resilience; 
• Recognising the impact of demographic shifts on resilience; and, 
• Shared responsibility and facilitating self-reliance. 
9.3.1 Recognising the contribution of volunteers and community groups to 
resilience 
Some participants highlighted the importance of community connectedness and self-reliance 
in achieving resilience. Many acknowledged and applauded the work of volunteers. There 
was a perception that some volunteer groups may have been denied the opportunity to assist 
during emergencies (e.g. they were not able to make tea and sandwiches for emergency 
volunteers because of hygiene training requirements). Such restrictions effectively stripped 
such organisations of the ability to contribute to improving community resilience. Participants 
suggested that the contribution of volunteers and non-emergency management community 
groups (such as service organisations) should be acknowledged, supported and enhanced, 
as they assist in emergency situations and recovery.  
9.3.2 Recognising the impact of demographic shifts on resilience 
Participants recognised that demographic shifts have had a range of implications for 
emergency management and that these needed to be recognised in community engagement 
and resilience building. Issues raised included that: 
• In some areas the aging population profile has resulted in a demand for more face-to-
face information and active involvement through volunteering; 
• There is an increasingly high mobility rate (i.e. people not staying in the same 
community) which can have both a positive and a negative impact on community 
resilience (e.g. the relocation of urban people to peri-urban and rural-residential areas 
for lifestyle reasons doesn’t necessarily correspond with a good understanding of the 
risks or expectations of service delivery);  
• There is an increasing number of people from non-English speaking backgrounds that 
may make communication difficult; 
• Changing lifestyles and limited personal experience of hardship may have reduced 
resilience at the individual and community level; and, 
• The link between resilience, risk and vulnerability needs to be better understood to 
support informed community and government decision-making.  
9.3.3 Shared responsibility and facilitating self-reliance 
Some participants believed that community resilience needs to be based on shaping social 
norms that make preparation for emergencies part of everyday life and that this needed to be 
based on an all hazards approach. The metaphor of a first aid kit was proposed because 
they were seen to embody the ideals of preparedness and self-reliance built on an all 
hazards approach because a first aid contains a range of multi-purpose supplies to respond 
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to a range of injuries regardless of their cause. First aid kits were also seen to be part of 
everyday living and integrated into everyday decision-making and response.  
The idea of shared responsibility was considered to be an important component of building 
community resilience, however, some participants felt that, to date, the implementation of this 
idea had been top-down in its approach. It was argued that shared responsibility requires the 
government to support the community in developing the life and decision-making skills to 
prepare for, and respond to, hazards. Incentive programs (e.g. subsidies for water tanks or 
solar panels) can facilitate positive changes in behaviour and self-reliance. It is important to 
note that this focus on self-reliance and community empowerment was seen as a 
complement to, not a replacement for, the provision of government services and 
infrastructure. Shared responsibility is also contingent on the understanding that community, 
household, social, infrastructure and organisational/government resilience are 
interconnected. 
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10. INTEGRATING DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
10.1 The literature and inquiry reports 
The past few years have seen significant progress in the convergence of climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk management, at least in terms of intentions and policy 
statements, so that there is now a significant overlap of concepts and shared goals (Mitchell, 
et al. 2010). There is also a general agreement, both nationally and internationally, that 
adaptation is an important tool for managing risks, reducing vulnerability and building 
resilience (COAG 2007:3; UN-HFA 2005; UN-ISDR 2009). Despite this recognition significant 
barriers to effective policy integration remain (Mitchell, et al. 2010).  
The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission identified climate change as having implications 
for bushfire policy reform (VBRC 2010c:xvii, 13) and supported vulnerability and risk 
assessments to examine the potential impacts of climate change on fire management, 
including “the extent to which adaptive management of fire regimes in the face of climate 
change, especially the use of prescribed burning, may mitigate risk to multiple landscape 
values” (VBRC 2010c Appendix A: 22). The Royal Commission suggested that:  
“Research should embrace future challenges facing Australia, among them the 
impact of climate change on the frequency and nature of bushfire and the subject of 
fire at the peri-urban fringe” (VBRC 2010c:392). 
Climate change was acknowledged as an issue for land use planning with the Commission 
noting that “consideration should be given to the increasing risk exposure arising from 
climate change projections of more frequent occurrence of catastrophic fire” (VBRC 
2010c:223). Climate change was also seen by the Commission as an argument for increased 
prescribed burning (VBRC 2010c:292). 
The Special Inquiry into the Perth Hills bushfires referred to long-term weather forecasts by 
the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) that provided “significant data to suggest that the Perth 
Hills and the immediate area are undergoing significant climate change when viewed over a 
thirty year period” (GWA 2011:11). It further acknowledged that: 
 “The warming of the earth’s surface will have the potential to impact directly upon 
fuel loads and their management into the future and while not a Term of Reference 
the Climate Commission’s Report appears compelling, the evidence that the Earth is 
warming on a multi-decadal timescale, and at a very fast rate by geological 
standards, is now overwhelming” (GWA 2011:12). 
The Special Inquiry noted the vulnerabilities, particularly as they relate to the built 
environment and services. In terms of preparation, it is suggested that all sectors increase 
awareness of critical infrastructure service supplies and its realities related to water, power 
and the functioning of roads and bridges. With regards to response measures, the focus was 
on Incident Action Plans and assessments of bridge integrity. As it related to infrastructure, 
recovery involved: calculating the true costs to infrastructure; field exercises with tests of 
critical infrastructure; and the upkeep of fire hydrants for water supply. The Special Inquiry 
stated that: “the first step is to recognise that changes to our climate can be the catalyst to 
reform legislation and policy as they apply to the Perth Hills” (GWA 2011:12). 
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With policy and legislative reform in mind, one specific recommendation was put forward 
that: “The State Government recognise the projected changes in climate and potential impact 
on future fire events” (GWA 2011:158). The Special Inquiry noted that this is “highly relevant 
to Terms of Reference 1 in terms of preparations for the future”. This relates to questioning 
the adequacy of current preventative measures, specifically prescribed burning and other 
bushfire mitigation activities. In light of this, it is advised that “some recognition should be 
given to the changes in climate that might require a new approach to prevention against 
bushfires” (GWA 2011:11). The Special Inquiry called for legislative and policy reform and a 
new approach, but exactly what legislation and policy this refers to is left unspecified. 
Moreover, how learning may be integrated to facilitate a new approach is unstated. 
The Queensland Floods Inquiry report does not discuss the relationship between current 
flood mitigation and climate change adaptation, nor does it recommend specific 
consideration of climate change in flood mitigation policy and practice. It does, however, 
discuss briefly how climate change may influence flood impacts and how it will be considered 
within flood modelling and dam management. The expectation is that the range of variability 
associated with climate change will be incorporated into the Monte Carlo analyses 
undertaken by SEQWater (2010) and the various local authorities in the process of modelling 
potential future flooding extremes. The report also highlighted the problem of using climate 
change information in terms of potential liability on the part of a local council from doing so, 
and notes concerns from the Local Government Association of Queensland: 
“…councils are concerned about the prospect of liability; for example, for losses 
caused by flood where rebuilding has been approved after previous flooding, even if 
the owner knew of the risk… Gold Coast City Council has raised similar concerns 
about liability should it publish information about possible effects of climate change, 
and has pointed out that the lack of legislative prescription for flood modelling may 
leave local government flood modelling open to challenge on a case by case basis” 
(QFCI 2012:128). 
10.2 Interviews 
In all of the interviews there was a clear consensus that climate change adaptation needs to 
be factored into disaster risk management. It was seen as “an amplifier of risk and a lot of 
what the climate change people are looking at is fundamentally exactly the same things that 
emergency management people are looking at” (Victorian government official 3). It was also 
seen to cause “shifts in risk profiles” (West Australian government official 1). Other 
respondents acknowledged that climate change will lead to greater environmental volatility 
(Victorian government official 6) and increased uncertainty (Victorian government official 7 
and Researcher 1). 
One respondent argued that climate change would have to be factored into day-to-day 
decision-making as well as the overall approach of the emergency management sector and 
the broader public service:  
“Well implications for the sector are clearly that it has to do its business in a different 
way than it’s done it in the past. That more of the same is just simply not going to 
work and the other key theme that came out during the bushfires and the floods 
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review in Victoria is a focus on what’s called the ‘all agencies, all risks approach’” 
(Victorian government official 2).  
Another suggested that: “It's got to become part of the risk analysis and I think they're 
starting to do it here as far as particularly around bushfires” (West Australian government 
official 3). Another respondent suggested that: “Land use planning has a critical role to 
actually help support adaptation strategies because they are generational” (Queensland 
government official 2).   
One of the key barriers to the integration was the need for emergency service workers to 
understand the impacts of climate change on disasters in order to change what they do:  
“That is a real challenge because the emergency management practitioners need to 
be - need to understand - they won't change behaviour until they first grasp the 
understanding.  Then they start to say, well that is relevant to me and perhaps I do 
need to change my behaviour and then over time it will change” (West Australian 
government official 4).   
Another suggested that one way to do this was to “get the scientists who have a lot to share 
about climate change and climate change adaptation talking to the operational people” (West 
Australian government official 5).  
One respondent suggested that this engagement and learning should extend across the 
whole public sector to the community: “So there's interest across all the agencies and better 
preparation, better understanding and adaptation measures preparing communities for that” 
(Queensland government official 1). Another argued that:  
“as the community becomes more aware of climate change as a reality and it’s not 
tainted by political views, so it has a scientific basis to it, then I think they’re more 
amenable to take in their own protective measures and also working in better with 
local councils in the council risk management” (Queensland government official 5).  
Any attempt at policy integration will rely on the political will of the government of the day, 
and changes of governments can lead to major changes in priorities (Queensland 
government official 2). It will also have to be backed up with some serious funding (Victorian 
government official 10). The acceptance of the need to change must extend to both public 
sector workers (Queensland government official 3 and West Australian government official 4) 
and the broader community (Victorian government official 9).  
10.3 Workshops 
Some participants suggested that there is still a lot of uncertainty around climate change 
within political and community arenas and that it remains a controversial issue. They 
suggested that there is limited political confidence to act because it can be difficult to sell the 
idea to government when there is limited community, media or business support for action. 
There is also the problem of the conflation of climate change with climate variability. 
Projecting the future impact of extreme events is problematic, but the uncertainty should not 
be seen as a barrier to planning for change. Current day vulnerability can be used as an 
initial platform for thinking through the impacts of future extreme events. 
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Confidence in climate science is a contested political issue that influences government 
commitments to community information and education programs. Many participants, 
particularly those not actively engaged in a climate change related role, suggested that 
climate change is difficult to understand, uncertain and is far from the daily lived experience, 
which makes it difficult to engage on the issue. Similarly, participants noted that many people 
do not believe that a disaster event will happen to them so they do not act because the threat 
is not perceived as real.  
Participants argued that climate change adaption needs to be mainstreamed and pitched at a 
level to which emergency management practitioners, policymakers and the community can 
relate. Research on the likely impacts at the household and community level needs to be 
both available and accessible (jargon free) to support a better understanding especially in 
terms of resilience and preparedness. It was proposed that climate and other science should 
form part of disaster risk reduction messages. The information required to assist people to 
make informed decisions should be accessible both in terms of the way that it is presented 
(its language) and its availability. The availability and promotion of this kind of scientific 
information was seen to be a vital component of building trust, increasing knowledge and 
acceptance of climate issues and risks. 
It was observed that the politics of climate change restricts the ability to integrate it into 
established and ‘respectable’ fields like emergency management. It was suggested that the 
adoption of adaptation strategies across the public sector is patchy. Those agencies which 
tend to do this best are those that are dependent on, and influenced by, climate change in a 
significant way (e.g. agriculture or water agencies). It was agreed that there is a need to 
recognise that disaster risk reduction and emergency management activities are significantly 
affected by climate. In order to become respected and integrated into decision-making it was 
proposed that climate change discussions need to become part of the day-to-day business of 
government and business. 
There was also some discussion regarding the clash between climate change adaptation and 
emergency management, disaster management and disaster risk reduction discourses and 
the potential impact of this on shared understandings between the disciplines. 
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11. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH 
The objective of this project was to reconceptualise the twin problems of disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation, develop the foundations for a more integrated, 
nationally consistent approach to both issues, supported by appropriate institutional changes 
and policy tools, and propose practical changes to existing policy/planning responses. The 
preceding sections of this report have addressed all three of these objectives to varying 
degrees by summarising the relevant responses of the participating stakeholders. This 
section offers suggestions for change that are based on the analysis of the data collected. 
First, some options for reconceptualising the problem are outlined. Then, four proposals are 
introduced for practical changes that together form pathways towards a more integrated 
approach to disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Proposals 1 to 3 were 
put forward by the research team at all three workshops for review by the stakeholders. 
Proposal 3, in particular, would help with the development of risk context analysis tools 
through institutional learning. Proposal 4 is a composite of suggestions for organisational 
change that emerged from the workshop participants and interviewees themselves. 
The ideas outlined here have some parallel with studies in other policy areas. Ross and 
Dovers (2008), for example, proposed various strategies to integrate sustainability into 
mainstream policies. Rolfe, et al. (2009) reviewed ways to improve government and 
community engagement in the delivery of public services. Liebrecht and Howes (2006) 
considered improvements in interagency collaboration between the state and local levels of 
government. Howes and Dedekorkut-Howes (2012) offered strategies to encourage 
collaboration on climate change adaptation policymaking and planning from the national to 
the local level. Smit and Wandel (2006) considered ways to improve stakeholder participation 
in community adaptation. What we offer here, however, is a fresh take on the integration of 
disaster risk management and climate change adaptation 
11.1 Reconceptualising the problem 
One of the first steps in reconceptualising problems is to review the key concepts that they 
entail. In this case there has been some over-simplification in the understanding of both 
‘community’ and ‘resilience’ that can have some significant implications for the 
appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of policies or plans. This is particularly 
important at the very first stage of the policy making process where a risk-context analysis is 
needed to provide an appropriate foundation for the policy analysis and assist with the 
development and/or choice of appropriate policy tools. 
First, it is important to recognise there is not just one homogeneous community. Any group of 
people will contain different communities that may be based on geography (i.e. residents of 
the same area), interest (e.g. clubs, churches or internet-based activities), or circumstance 
(such as a shared experience) (UKCO 2010). Any policy or plan will therefore have to identify 
which is the target community and be flexible enough to cope with the diversity amongst its 
members. One size does not fit all! 
Second, resilience is a complex term with many different definitions. One of the more widely 
accepted is offered by the IPCC that defines resilience as: 
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“The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, 
or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its 
essential basic structures and functions” (IPCC 2012:5).  
Hence it can be seen in various guises, such as the resistance to, accommodation of, or 
recovery from an impact. Further, different members of a community will have differing levels 
and types of resilience or vulnerability. These will in turn be influenced by environmental, 
economic and social factors. 
The rethinking of these two concepts suggests that any effective policy or plan will have to be 
context specific. It will need to recognise the diversity within a given community and tailor its 
engagement programs accordingly. 
The next point goes back to the debate summarised in section 4.2 regarding whether 
policymaking can be understood as a process that is best described either as rational 
comprehensive or incremental. In this context it may a wise strategy to abandon pursuit of 
the rational comprehensive ideal that risks holding up the policymaking process because of: 
1) the high level of uncertainty inherent in climate change adaptation and disaster risk 
management; and, 2) the highly contested political context. A Bayesian iterative approach 
could be more helpful, where: various incremental responses are tried; their effectiveness, 
efficiency and appropriateness are reviewed; and, the results are used to inform preparations 
for the next round of responses. This will not produce a comprehensive plan, but it can lead 
to significant, context-specific changes over time within a broader policy framework. These 
ideas will be followed up in later publications. 
11.2 Proposal 1: Collaborative funding 
Traditionally all three levels of government have funded specific departments or agencies 
and their associated programs. This may encourage competition for funds between agencies 
or levels of government and discourage collaboration. What if part of the pool of public 
funding was set aside and attached to resolving particular problems? What if agencies were 
encouraged to form consortiums across all levels of government, as well as with the private 
and community sectors, in order to bid for these funds? This could create a tangible financial 
incentive that encourages multi-level, interagency collaboration, as well as cross-sector 
partnerships (hence sharing the responsibility with business and the community). Some of 
the issues to which the money could be attached would be finding ways to build resilience to 
a range of natural disasters (such as floods and bushfires) and climate change. 
This proposal was raised for discussion at all three workshops and generally got a favourable 
response. There were some concerns, however, about the amount of time that would be 
taken up in applying for funding and undertaking project reporting, and the uncertainty 
around whether a project may get approval. Other concerns included the need to ensure that 
the approach gave adequate consideration to local and contextual issues, that it was seen to 
complement existing programs, and that it did not prevent agencies from delivering their 
‘core services’.  
In terms of practicality, there are already precedents for this approach to funding. Landcare 
grants have been operating for over two decades, allowing local community groups, 
government agencies, and businesses to bid for funding to rehabilitate various local 
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environments. More recently, the National Climate Change Adaptation Facility (which funds 
this project) offers grants to research specific problems that are bid for by consortiums of 
different universities, research organisations and government agencies. Although all levels of 
government are currently attempting to rein in spending, this proposal could simply be an 
expansion of the existing Natural Disaster Resilience Program grants scheme that is run 
under partnership agreements between the state and federal governments. Further, there 
are funds in the Caring for Our Country program (that includes Landcare) and Infrastructure 
Australia (that encourages public-private partnerships). Finally, COAG is currently reviewing 
its funding of the National Partnership Agreements devised in 2009, so this may be an 
opportune time to try this proposal. 
11.3 Proposal 2: Local community resilience grants 
Two key points that kept recurring throughout this research are: (1) the key role that local 
governments have to play in both climate change adaptation and disaster risk management; 
and, (2) the need for a sense of shared responsibility where the community and business 
take action to improve their own resilience. One way to address both these points could be 
through the development of a local community resilience grants scheme. The idea is that 
each council could set aside a small amount of their budget, (perhaps only a few hundred 
thousand dollars would be necessary) and advertise for the community to come up with 
proposals for simple projects to improve local resilience to disasters and climate change. 
(One project, for example, might be to establish a network of volunteers who take 
responsibility for ensuring that a particular group of elderly people get to safety during an 
emergency.) The council could then hold a public meeting and let the community vote on 
which proposals to fund. This could encourage innovative improvements in resilience and 
raise community awareness about their vulnerability. 
This proposal was discussed at the workshops and was generally endorsed. There were 
some concerns, however, about whether the community was convinced of the need to take 
action on climate change. Further, there was the question of whether there was a suitable 
level of awareness of the vulnerability to disasters such as floods and bushfires. Finally, 
there was the view that some sections of the community may believe that this kind of action 
should be left to the government. These concerns suggest that there would need to be a 
well-tailored public education and community engagement program to support such a 
scheme. 
On the practical side, many local governments already offer similar community grants 
programs. Some grants are used to fund local volunteer groups (such as surf life saving) 
while others fund small nature conservation projects and community centres. This proposal 
could simply create a new category of grants, redirect some of the existing money into 
building local resilience, and change the selection process to allow for a popular vote. Some 
work would obviously have to be done to assess the costs and benefits of such a program. 
11.4 Proposal 3: Embedded researchers 
The need for the emergency management workforce to understand the implications of 
climate change for disaster risk management emerged as a recurring theme throughout this 
project, particularly with regards to risk-context analyses. It was a need recognised by senior 
executives, officers on the ground, volunteers, and community groups. The problem is that 
climate science is complex and there are a lot of uncertainties in trying to identify impacts at 
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the local level. One proposal that we put forward was to embed climate researchers within 
emergency management organisations so that they could work with staff on developing a 
shared understanding of the risks and direct their research into areas of shared priority. This 
could be a two-way exchange and the researchers could also learn about the process of 
disaster risk management. Ideally they would have regular contact with front-line troops to 
improve their understanding of the shifting risk profile, as well as senior levels of 
management to help them see the big picture and recognise their shared objectives with 
other agencies. 
This idea was discussed along with a wide range of alternatives at the workshops and 
received qualified support. There were some concerns about how these researchers could 
be funded, who they would answer to, their ability to remain independent, and whether there 
would be some sensitivity if their research outputs were construed as critical of the host 
organisation. 
There are a several options for addressing these concerns. Some large agencies already 
have a research department, so adding a climate expert would fit easily into existing 
structures. Other agencies might not have this capacity but could potentially engage in 
ongoing partnerships with organisations that have the required expertise. Finally, there is the 
option of forming a consortium to research and learn about a specific threat. This might draw 
on existing funding such as the Australian Research Council Linkage Grant scheme or 
perhaps the kind of funds provided by our first proposal on collaborative funding.  
11.5 Proposal 4: Organisational change 
A number of different organisational change strategies emerged during this project that can 
be knitted together to form a coherent package for improvement. Starting at the top, COAG 
will need to play a key role in ensuring all levels of government are working towards an 
integrated approach to disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. It has 
already made a move towards a nationally consistent approach in both these individual areas 
(e.g. with the National Climate Change Adaptation Framework, the National Emergency Risk 
Assessment Guideline, and the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience) and has been 
supported by the relevant Ministerial and departmental committees (see section 4). What is 
needed is to review and reform existing arrangements into a more coherent system. This 
also needs to be done at the state level of government in order to generate a consistent 
executive commitment to improving resilience.  
The next change would be to create new, and/or revamp existing, interagency senior officer 
groups to translate executive commitment into day-to-day management changes within 
agencies. Finally, a network of ‘champions’ should be created across all agencies that 
involve staff who will look for ways to implement adaptation measures and provide points of 
interagency collaboration. These champions could be selected on the basis of their 
interpersonal skills, enthusiasm and willingness to develop long-term working relationships 
with staff in other agencies. They would also form working partnerships with business and 
community organisations. 
These ideas emerged from the interviews and participants in the workshops. Several 
participants talked about examples of where some of these changes had happened on a 
small scale but they emphasised the need for both a top-down commitment, and a bottom-up 
enthusiasm for change. A recurring theme was the need to build social capital within and 
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between organisations. The point was also made that staff need clear guidelines to decide 
when to collaborate and when to go it alone, as collective action requires a considerable 
investment of time and resources. 
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12. CONCLUSIONS 
Climate change has been labelled a ‘wicked’ policy problem because it is difficult to define, 
has complicated/unforeseen consequences, and requires a whole-of-government response. 
One of its potential impacts is to increase the frequency, duration and/or intensity of disasters 
such as floods and bushfires. These will have varying impacts on communities according to 
their climate, geography, and socio-economic status. What is therefore needed is a nationally 
consistent response to both climate change adaptation and disaster risk management that is 
built upon appropriate risk-context analyses and supported by the practical reform of both 
policy institutions and tools.  
This project has addressed this problem using a comparative case study of the 2009 
Victorian bushfires, the 2011 Perth Hills bushfires, and the 2011 Brisbane floods. The project 
started with a literature review and analysis of the inquiry reports into these events then 
moved on to interviews and workshops with key stakeholders. Four themes emerged from 
this analysis, relating to the need for improvements in: interagency communication and 
collaboration; institutional improvement and learning; community engagement and 
communication; and, a renewed focus on resilience. These themes provide the starting 
points for improving disaster risk management and integrating it with climate change 
adaptation. 
Some broad directions for reconceptualising the problems have been introduced and will be 
followed up in later publications. Four proposals for practical institutional and policy tool 
reform were also put forward that address the themes identified. First, was the idea of 
providing collaborative funding that would encourage agencies at all levels to work in 
partnership with each other, businesses and communities. Second, local community 
resilience grants could raise public awareness about local vulnerabilities and lead to some 
practical improvements in resilience. Third, embedding climate researchers in disaster risk 
management agencies would help these organisations to learn about the implications of 
climate change for their work and help them develop a shared goal of improving resilience. 
Finally, organisational changes that would improve networking across all sectors and levels 
were outlined. 
The consistency between the broader academic literature, the inquiry reports, the collected 
interview data and the feedback from the workshops suggest a high degree of confidence in 
our findings. Obviously there is a lot more work that needs to be done in this area, 
particularly with regards to following up on the detailed implementation of the proposed 
changes.  
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GLOSSARY 
The following definitions are quoted directly from the IPCC (2012) and Althaus, Bridgman & 
Davis (2007). [Annotations have been added in square brackets.] 
Adaptation 
“In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, 
in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process 
of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment 
to expected climate” (IPCC 2012:5).  
Climate Change 
“A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by 
changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes 
or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the 
atmosphere or in land use” (IPCC 2012:5). 
Climate Extreme (extreme weather or climate event) 
“The occurrence of a value of a weather or climate variable above (or below) a threshold 
value near the upper (or lower) ends of the range of observed values of the variable. For 
simplicity, both extreme weather events and extreme climate events are referred to 
collectively as ‘climate extremes’” (IPCC 2012:5). 
Disaster 
“Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to hazardous 
physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse 
human, material, economic, or environmental effects that require immediate emergency 
response to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support for recovery” 
(IPCC 2012:5).  
Disaster Risk 
“The likelihood over a specified time period of severe alterations in the normal functioning of 
a community or a society due to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social 
conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, economic, or environmental 
effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that 
may require external support for recovery” (IPCC 2012:5).  
Disaster Risk Management 
“Processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, policies, and measures to 
improve the understanding of disaster risk, foster disaster risk reduction and transfer, and 
promote continuous improvement in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery 
practices, with the explicit purpose of increasing human security, well-being, quality of life, 
resilience, and sustainable development” (IPCC 2012:5).  
 
52 Rethinking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation  
 
Policy 
“Policy is the instrument of governance, the decisions that direct public resources in one 
direction but not another. It is the outcome of the competition between ideas, interests and 
ideology that impels our political system” (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 2007:5). 
Resilience 
“The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or 
recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including 
through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic 
structures and functions” (IPCC 2012:5).  
Vulnerability 
“The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected” (IPCC 2012: 5). [Please note that 
both bio-physical and socio-economic factors may contribute to this propensity or 
predisposition.] 
Wicked Problems 
“‘Wicked problems’ refer to those dilemmas that either cannot be defined or, at best, are not 
open to easy formulation. Rittel and Webber (1973) explain that wicked problems are 
unstable in that they are characterised by embedded interdependencies where a possible 
‘solution’ can create yet another interlocking complex problem. Moreover, it is difficult to 
obtain clear or definitive expertise regarding possible solutions because the problem is either 
‘shifting’ or there is no way of learning about the issue without trying potential ‘answers’ that 
come with unintended consequences. It is impossible to isolate the problem, let alone work 
out what to do about it” (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis 2007:54). 
 
 

